Monomaterialism

Monomaterialism is a philosophical position asserting that there exists only one fundamental material substrate from which all phenomena derive. It is a form of monism with a material ontology, emphasizing a single kind of matter as the ground of reality and denying the existence of non-material substances. The term is used in discussions of metaphysics and philosophy of science, though it is not widely standardized and may be used differently by different authors.

In its core, monomaterialism posits that all entities—physical objects, biological processes, and mental states—are manifestations, arrangements, or emergent properties of one underlying material substrate. It is compatible with emergent properties insofar as such properties do not require new ontological kinds, but rather arise from complex organization of the same substrate. The position is often contrasted with dualism, idealism, and with pluralist or plural-material theories that allow multiple primitive substances or kinds of matter.

Variants include attempts to specify what counts as the single substrate (for example, a particular physical field, substance, or fundamental constituents) and how higher-level phenomena are explained through organization, interaction, and information. In philosophy of mind, monomaterialism generally aligns with physicalism, aiming to reduce or explain mental phenomena in physical terms.

Critics argue that the view can underdetermine explanations of complex systems and may struggle to account for genuine ontological novelty or qualitative differences. Proponents respond that a unified substrate can accommodate multiple levels of description without postulating extra substances.

See also: Materialism, Monism, Physicalism, Emergentism.