Materialismiphysicalismi

Materialismiphysicalismi is a term sometimes used to refer to a combined or overlapping stance in ontology and philosophy of mind that emphasizes the physical basis of reality and, more specifically, the idea that what exists is ultimately material and physical. The term is not widely standardized, but it signals the convergence of two related positions: materialism and physicalism.

Materialism is the view that matter constitutes the fundamental substance of reality; at its core, all phenomena, including mental phenomena, are ultimately explained in terms of material interactions. In broader usage, historical materialism is a separate doctrine associated with social and economic structures, but in contemporary philosophy it is often treated as a precursor to physicalist accounts of reality.

Physicalism holds that everything is physical in the sense of being governed by the laws of physics; most physicalists claim mental states either are physical states or supervene on them. Debates within physicalism distinguish reductive physicalism, which identifies mental properties with brain states, from non-reductive physicalism, which allows mental properties to depend on physical states without being reducible to them.

Relation to the term: materialismiphysicalismi is typically used to describe a unified view that matter and physical law are the ultimate basis of reality, and that mental phenomena must be accounted for within a physical framework. It is central to discussions of the mind–body problem, consciousness, and the status of non-physical explanations.

Critics argue that the stance faces the explanatory gap and challenges regarding qualia, intentionality, and the nature of consciousness; some philosophers advocate dualism, panpsychism, or emergentism as alternatives. See also monism, materialism, physicalism, reductionism, and the mind–body problem.