Lavtypeaktører

Lavtypeaktører is a term used in economics and related social sciences to describe agents whose private type is lower on a specific dimension than other agents in a setting characterized by asymmetric information. The type of an actor may represent productivity, cost of effort, risk tolerance, or other relevant characteristics that are not directly observable by market participants. In such models, actors are frequently categorized into low-type and high-type groups, with the distinction influencing their incentives and the design of contracts or mechanisms.

In principal-agent and contract theory, the presence of lavtypeaktører generates adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Low-type agents may choose to reveal or conceal information strategically, or to exert effort in ways that depend on the contract’s structure. Mechanisms are often designed to be incentive compatible and individually rational for all types, constraining both pooling and separating equilibria. The distribution of types and the cost structures determine which equilibria are feasible.

Applications span labor markets, credit and insurance, procurement, and regulatory policy. For a given mechanism, a higher share of low-type actors can reduce average productivity or increase default risk unless incentives are properly aligned. Designers may use screening, self-selection, or a menu of contracts to separate or deter low-type misrepresentation while maintaining participation.

See also adverse selection, signaling, screening, mechanism design, principal-agent theory.