Illokution

Illokution, more commonly spelled illocution in contemporary usage, refers to the speaker’s intended performative force of an utterance. It is distinguished from the locutionary act, which is the utterance’s surface meaning, and the perlocutionary effect, which is the actual impact on the listener. Illocutionary force encompasses functions such as asserting, ordering, promising, or apologizing.

The concept originated with J. L. Austin in the mid-20th century, notably in his work How to Do Things with Words. Austin argued that language often performs actions rather than merely describes. John Searle later expanded on the theory, offering a more systematic account of illocutionary acts and their role in communication, commitments, and social interaction.

Direct illocutionary acts state the function straightforwardly (for example, "I promise to come" performs a promise). Indirect illocutionary acts achieve the same goal through context or form (for example, "It’s cold in here" may function as a request to close the window).

Searle’s influential classification of illocutionary acts includes five broad categories: representatives (stating beliefs or facts), directives (requests, orders), commissives (promises, vows), expressives (apologies, congratulations), and verdictives (judgments, assessments).

Felicity conditions describe the prerequisites for an illocutionary act to be appropriate and effective, including the speaker’s competence, sincerity, and adherence to conventional social norms. If these conditions are not met, the act can be infelicitous or fail to achieve its intended effect.

In modern pragmatics and philosophy of language, illocution remains a foundational concept for analyzing how speakers perform actions, interpret indirect speech, and negotiate meaning in social contexts.