Epistemicism

Epistemicism is a position in the philosophy of vagueness that holds there are sharp, precise boundaries in the world for vague predicates, even though to us those boundaries are unknown. According to this view, statements involving vague terms such as "bald," "tall," or "heap" have definite truth conditions, but we lack the epistemic access to know exactly where those conditions lie.

The central claim is that there exists an exact cut-off or threshold along a relevant spectrum that determines whether an object satisfies the predicate. For example, there would be a precise number of grains that makes a collection a heap, and a precise point at which it ceases to be one. Our inability to determine or recognize that boundary accounts for ordinary vagueness and the failure of common reasoning in sorites-style arguments. There is no indeterminacy or truth-value gaps; truth values are crisp, even if they are not knowable to us.

Epistemicism is often associated with the work of Timothy Williamson, who argues that vague expressions posses sharp truth conditions, yet our knowledge about them is limited by epistemic constraints. Proponents contend that the view preserves objectivity and avoids the drift towards semantic indeterminacy or multiple precise interpretations.

Critics argue that epistemicism cannot fully explain the phenomenology of vagueness, such as the perception that borderline cases feel indeterminate or that different speakers use thresholds differently. Alternative theories, such as supervaluationism or contextual approaches, treat vagueness as genuine indeterminacy or as context-dependent, rather than relying on unknown sharp cut-offs.