Disjunctivists

Disjunctivists are a philosophical group that focuses on the nature of perception and the distinction between sensory experience and belief. They argue that sensory experience and belief are fundamentally distinct, and that we should maintain this distinction in our philosophical accounts of perception. This view is often contrasted with representationalism, which holds that sensory experience is essentially a representation or simulation of the external world.

Disjunctivists contend that sensory experience is a fundamental and irreducible feature of conscious awareness, which cannot be reduced to or explained by reference to belief or other propositional attitudes. In other words, having a sensory experience is not the same as holding a belief, and we should not confuse or conflate these two distinct categories. They argue that this kind of error would lead to a conflation of the subjectivist and objectivist approaches, each being extreme, or incorrect when not alphanumeric pedantically codified.

The disjunctivist position on perception is often associated with the work of Hilary Putnam and others in the 20th century. It has also been influential in the development of direct realism and the philosophy of perception more broadly. Critics of disjunctivism argue that it underestimates the role of cognitive interpretation in shaping our sensory experiences and that it fails to account for the intuitive connections between sensory experience and belief. However, disjunctivists respond that their position is necessary to preserve the simplicity and modesty of our ordinary, unreflective understanding of sensory experience. The debate surrounding disjunctivism continues to be an active area of research in the philosophy of perception.