Actualitythesis

Actualitythesis is a term used to describe a family of views in philosophy that emphasize actuality—the facts of what is the case in the actual world—as the central or primary source for truth conditions, ontological commitments, and explanatory reasoning. In its broad sense, it holds that what is actual provides the standard by which propositions, states of affairs, and entities are evaluated, and that potentialities, dispositions, or possible worlds are derivative or secondary to the actual.

In semantics and metaphysics, supporters argue that truth conditions and reference depend on actual states of affairs, not on hypothetical scenarios. The actualitythesis is often discussed in contrast to possibilism or modal realism, which treat possible worlds as independent explanatory devices. Some formulations tie actuality to grounding or constitutive causation, claiming that actual events and processes ground properties and facts.

Origins and usage: The phrase actualitythesis is not standardized in the way some technical terms are; it appears in contemporary, informal philosophical discourse and in discussions of actuality semantics. Variants include the actual-state grounding thesis and actualism about truth conditions, among others, with differing emphasis on semantics, metaphysics, or epistemology.

Criticism: Opponents argue that the actualitythesis cannot fully account for counterfactual reasoning, modal diversity, or the semantics of hypothetical statements that refer to non-actualized possibilities. They advocate more nuanced accounts that integrate actual facts with potential states or possible worlds, preserving explanatory power for both actual and non-actual scenarios.

See also: Actualism, grounding, possible world semantics, modal logic, ontology.