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Representationalism is a philosophical theory concerning the nature of mental states, particularly perception and consciousness. It posits that mental states like perceptions, beliefs, and thoughts are constituted by representations. These representations are understood as internal states or processes that stand for or are about objects, events, or states of affairs in the world. In simpler terms, when we perceive something, according to representationalism, our mind forms an internal representation of that thing, and it is this representation, not the thing itself, that we are directly aware of.

This view distinguishes between the object of our mental state and the vehicle of our mental state. The vehicle is the internal representation, and the object is what that representation is about. Representationalism is a broad category, and various accounts exist within it. Some theories focus on the content of mental states, arguing that this content is representational. Others emphasize the functional role of mental states, suggesting that a state is representational if it plays a certain kind of functional role in a cognitive system, typically involving causal connections to the environment and the production of behavior.

A key aspect of representationalism is its attempt to explain how our mental lives can be about the world. By positing internal representations, it provides a framework for understanding intentionality, the property of mental states to be directed towards or to be about something. However, representationalism also faces challenges, such as explaining the nature of consciousness itself and the subjective quality of experience, often referred to as qualia. Critics sometimes question whether internal representations can fully account for the richness and immediacy of our conscious awareness.