nominalistliku

Nominalistliku, in English nominalism, is a family of philosophical views that holds that universals—general terms such as "redness" or "dog"—do not exist as independent, abstract entities. Instead, only particular things and the names or concepts we use to describe them exist. General terms are considered to be linguistic or mental conveniences that group alike things, but do not point to real, separate universals.

Historically, nominalism arose in opposition to medieval realism, which claimed that universals have real existence independent of the objects they apply to. Early advocates argued that apparent similarities among things do not require a shared universal; rather, our language and classifications reflect habits of thought and common usage. The medieval figure often associated with robust nominalism is William of Ockham, who argued that we should avoid multiplying entities beyond necessity and treat universals as names that apply to many particulars. Later nominalists, such as the faculty of scholastic nominalists, refined the position and influenced the development of modern philosophy of language and science.

Core tenets of nominalism include the denial of universals as real entities, the rejection of abstruse ontologies of forms, and the view that scientific and everyday predicates are useful conventions for describing patterns among individuals. Some modern descendants of nominalism incorporate trope theory or conceptualist elements, offering nuanced ways to account for predication without invoking independent universals. Debates persist about how terms refer, how predicates apply across many objects, and how science expresses general laws without committing to abstract entities.

Nominalism contrasts with realism, conceptualism, and various intermediate positions. Its influence extends to philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the methodology of science.