neurophilosophy

Neurophilosophy is a field at the intersection of neuroscience and philosophy that uses findings about the brain to inform questions about mind, cognition, and action. Often traced to the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland in the 1980s, it advocates a naturalized approach to philosophy in which empirical neuroscience contributes to theories of consciousness, perception, memory, and reasoning while retaining core philosophical aims. The term has been used both to describe a program of methodological integration and to denote a broader movement within cognitive science that treats mental states as brain states or brain processes.

Neurophilosophers examine long-standing problems such as the mind-body problem, the nature of consciousness and qualia, mental representation, and the conditions for meaning and knowledge. A central priority is to explain or reinterpret mental phenomena in terms of neural mechanisms, without rendering philosophy merely a branch of neuroscience. This often involves engaging with findings from neuroimaging, neuropsychology, and computational modeling, as well as classic thought experiments about free will, personal identity, and moral responsibility. Notable ideas linked to neurophilosophy include Antonio Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis and debates over reductionism, emergentism, and supervenience, as well as critiques of purely a priori accounts of consciousness.

Critics argue that neurophilosophy risks scientism or neglects subjective experience and phenomenology, while supporters contend that integrating science with philosophy improves explanatory power and avoids speculative dualism. The field has influenced philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics, and it remains a dynamic interface between empirical research and conceptual analysis.