metarepresentations

Metarepresentations are representations that stand about or refer to other representations. In other words, they are representations of representations, or states that represent propositional content that itself represents reality or mental content. A basic example is a belief about a belief: “I believe that it is raining.” Here the outer representation (the belief) is about an inner representation (the proposition that it is raining).

In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, metarepresentations are central to discussions of consciousness, self-awareness, and theory of mind. Higher-order representations—such as higher-order thoughts or perceptions that one has about a lower-level mental state—are often invoked to explain conscious access and self-knowledge. Some theories claim that a mental state becomes conscious only when there is a metarepresentation of that state. Others allow for consciousness without explicit higher-order representations. Metarepresentation also helps explain how people attribute mental states to others, enabling theory of mind, deception, irony, and sarcasm.

In linguistics and social cognition, metarepresentation underpins the interpretation of utterances that involve beliefs about beliefs. For example, reporting another’s belief, or recognizing irony, requires attributing nested mental states. These nested representations support how speakers convey and infer intentions, attitudes, and epistemic standings.

In artificial intelligence and cognitive architectures, metarepresentations are used to model knowledge about knowledge, track epistemic states, and implement metacognitive strategies. They allow systems to reason about their own information and processes, enabling activities such as uncertainty monitoring and self-assessment.