factualism

Factualism is a family of philosophical positions that treat facts about the world as the fundamental basis for truth, knowledge, and explanation. Proponents generally hold that there are objective states of affairs that determine the truth of propositions, and that linguistic and theoretical representations should accurately mirror those states of affairs.

In the philosophy of science and epistemology, factualism emphasizes that empirical facts provide the main evidential grounds for evaluating theories. Theories are judged by their success in describing or predicting observable facts, and theoretical entities are admitted insofar as they help account for those facts. This view is often contrasted with instrumentalism and some forms of constructivism that treat theories as tools without committing to underlying facts.

In ethics and metaethics, the term is sometimes used to describe positions that grounding evaluative judgments in factual descriptions or objective states of affairs, aligning with forms of moral realism. Critics argue that it can be unclear which facts suffice to ground moral truths and whether value-laden aspects of ethics can be reduced to merely factual matter.

Philosophical debates about factualism address the status and accessibility of facts, the nature of truth conditions, and how to handle underdetermination and theory-ladenness of observation. Supporters appeal to objectivity and explanatory adequacy, while critics challenge the sufficiency and clarity of the supposed fact-corroboration.

See also: realism, correspondence theory of truth, fact-value distinction, empiricism.