expressivismi

Expressivism is a philosophical theory within ethics and metaethics that emphasizes the expressive or communicative functions of moral judgments and attitudes. Unlike cognitivist views, which treat moral statements as descriptive claims about objective facts, expressivism argues that moral language primarily serves to express emotions, attitudes, or intentions rather than convey truth-apt propositions.

The theory traces its roots to early 20th-century philosophers such as G.E. Moore and later developed by figures like A.J. Ayer, Richard Brandt, and Simon Blackburn. Moore’s "non-naturalism" suggested that moral properties are distinct from natural facts, while Ayer’s emotivism claimed moral statements were mere expressions of approval or disapproval, devoid of factual content. Later versions, such as error theory and quasi-realism, refined these ideas, acknowledging some cognitive elements while maintaining that moral language is fundamentally expressive.

Expressivism often addresses the "queerness" problem—why moral properties would differ from ordinary natural properties—by focusing on their role in guiding behavior and shaping social interactions. Critics argue that expressivism struggles to account for moral disagreement and the possibility of objective moral truths, while supporters highlight its ability to explain the emotional and practical dimensions of ethics.

Variations of expressivism include ethical non-cognitivism, which denies that moral statements can be true or false, and ethical realism combined with expressivist elements, which retains some cognitive claims while acknowledging expressive functions. The theory remains influential in contemporary metaethics, particularly in debates about the nature of moral language and the foundations of normative reasoning.