expressivismen

Expressivismen, or expressivism, is a metaethical theory about the nature of moral judgments. It holds that moral claims do not aim to describe features of the world but express the speaker’s attitudes, feelings, or prescriptions. Accordingly, moral statements like “lying is wrong” function primarily to express disapproval and to influence the attitudes and actions of others, rather than to report facts.

As a form of non-cognitivism, expressivism denies that moral sentences are truth-apt in virtue of objective states of affairs. Different expressivist positions vary in how they account for the apparent objectivity of moral discourse. Classical emotivism treated moral language as mere expressions of emotion. Contemporary expressivism, notably in the work of Simon Blackburn, attempts to preserve the practical force of morality while offering a non-realist semantics; Blackburn’s quasi-realism argues that speakers naturally use realist-friendly moral discourse without committing to mind-independent moral facts. Allan Gibbard’s version emphasizes that moral judgments express commitments that guide behavior under certain norms, and that disagreement often reflects competing plans rather than factual disputes.

Historically, expressivism arose as an alternative to prescriptive realism and traditional emotivism in late 20th-century metaethics. It has influenced debates about moral disagreement, objectivity, and the nature of moral reasons, and has been extended to other domains of evaluation, such as aesthetics and political language.

Critics have challenged expressivism on multiple fronts, arguing it cannot fully account for moral progress, moral error, or the seeming objectivity of moral discourse; others question whether it can deliver a satisfactory account of the normative force of moral judgments. Despite these debates, expressivism remains a central option in contemporary metaethics, shaping how philosophers understand moral language and normativity.