Representationalists

Representationalism is a philosophical theory about the nature of mental states, particularly perception and consciousness. It proposes that the contents of our conscious experience are representations of the external world. In simpler terms, when we see a red apple, the mental state we have is not the apple itself, but rather a representation or model of the red apple within our minds.

This theory suggests that our sensory input is processed and interpreted by the brain, resulting in mental states that bear a resemblance to the things they represent. These representations are thought to be propositional, meaning they can be true or false. For instance, the representation of a red apple is true if there is indeed a red apple in front of us.

Key aspects of representationalism include the idea that mental states have intentionality, meaning they are directed towards objects or states of affairs. The theory seeks to explain how the mind can have access to and interact with the world around it. Different versions of representationalism exist, varying in their accounts of the nature and properties of these mental representations. Some argue that representations are similar to pictures, while others propose more abstract or symbolic forms. The debate within representationalism often centers on the relationship between these mental representations and the objective reality they are believed to depict.