Libetlike

Libetlike is an adjective used in neuroscience and philosophy to describe experiments, interpretations, or phenomena that resemble the work of Benjamin Libet on volition and free will. The term derives from Libet’s 1983 experiments on the timing of conscious intention relative to neural preparation for voluntary action.

In Libet's study, participants performed a simple voluntary movement while EEG recorded brain activity. They reported the moment they became aware of the intention to act using a rotating clock. The results showed that the readiness potential, a buildup of electrical activity in motor areas, began approximately 0.5 seconds before movement and before reported intention. Libet interpreted this as evidence that unconscious neural processes initiate actions, with conscious will exerting a veto only shortly before action (the so-called "free won't").

Libetlike research extends or challenges this view by applying similar methods to other actions, refining measurement of intention timing, or proposing models where conscious awareness interacts with ongoing motor preparation. The label is used for discussions about whether volition is purely unconscious, whether awareness has causal efficacy, and how timing data should be interpreted.

Critics argue that readiness potentials may reflect general preparatory activity or non-specific motor readiness rather than a decision to act. They also point to methodological concerns in timing reports and the ecological validity of the task. Despite debates, Libetlike work continues to influence debates about free will, agency, and the neural basis of decision-making, with newer theories such as two-stage models and interpretive frameworks that reconcile unconscious initiation with conscious control.