Koordinationsproblem

Koordinationsproblem, or coordination problem, is a situation in which two or more agents can achieve better outcomes by aligning their actions, but lack of communication or uncertainty about others’ choices makes it difficult to select a single, mutually beneficial plan. The central challenge is the presence of multiple plausible equilibria, which can lead to coordination failure if participants do not converge on one.

In game-theoretic terms, coordination problems are often modeled as coordination games. A key distinction is between pure coordination games, where the players’ payoffs are highest when they select the same action and any of several identical best responses can work, and games like the Battle of the Sexes, where different equilibria exist and selecting which equilibrium to target depends on conventions or communication. Classic examples include the Stag Hunt, where both players prefer to coordinate on a high-payoff action (hunting stag) but face a risk if the other player chooses differently.

Solutions to coordinations problems rely on signals, conventions, or institutions that help select a particular equilibrium. These can take the form of pre-play communication, shared norms, standardization, or formal rules that create focal points. In economic theory, the concept of focal points, introduced by Thomas Schelling, explains how individuals can coordinate without explicit agreement.

Real-world relevance is broad: standard-setting for technologies, traffic and safety protocols, financial regulation, and international policy coordination all hinge on overcoming coordination problems to achieve stable, efficient outcomes.