Jumporiented

Jumporiented, in the context of computer security, refers to Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP), a class of exploitation techniques that achieve arbitrary code execution by chaining together short sequences of existing code, called gadgets, that end with a jump instruction rather than a return.

Gadgets are small fragments of legitimate machine code found in the target program or its libraries. Each gadget performs a tiny operation and then transfers control to the next gadget via an indirect jump or a jump table. An attacker assembles a sequence of gadgets to implement a desired functionality while avoiding detection and problematic instructions.

In contrast to return-oriented programming (ROP), which relies on a chain of gadgets connected by return instructions on the stack, JOP relies on a dispatcher or state machine that selects the next gadget through jumps. This dispatcher can be implemented using register state, memory values, or indirect control-flow primitives, and it can operate without a conventional stack-based gadget chain. As a result, JOP can be more resilient to certain stack-based mitigations and may complicate some detection techniques that look specifically for return-oriented patterns.

JOP has been studied across multiple architectures and is considered a theoretical and practical concern alongside ROP. It highlights the broader challenge of control-flow hijacking when attackers can redirect execution to any gadget sequence within executable code sections. Defenses against JOP include robust control-flow integrity mechanisms, shadow stacks, proper use of indirect-branch protections, code randomization, and architectural features designed to enforce legitimate control-flow transfers. See also: return-oriented programming, gadget-based exploitation, control-flow integrity.