Gettierlike

Gettierlike is an adjective used in epistemology to describe cases, arguments, or problems that resemble the classic Gettier problem. In a Gettierlike scenario, a person has a justified true belief but does not know, typically because the truth of the belief rests on luck or an incidental coincidence that the justification does not rule out.

Origin and use: The term derives from Edmund Gettier's 1963 paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, which showed that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Since then, scholars have used Gettierlike or Gettier-style to classify new thought experiments and debates that share the same structure: justification that would normally support knowledge fails due to luck or a defeater.

Patterns and purpose: Gettierlike cases usually involve two features: (1) the agent has a justified belief that is true; (2) there exists a plausible alternative that is equally justified but false, or a coincidence that makes the true outcome accidental. The label signals that the issue concerns the robustness of justification as a condition for knowledge rather than merely true belief.

Responses: Gettierlike problems have motivated responses such as safety/factor analyses of knowledge, reliabilism, and externalist approaches that separate the mental state from its truth-conducive processes. They remain a central reference point in debates about what knowledge requires beyond justified true belief.