Eliminationism

Eliminationism refers to a family of philosophical positions that argue for the elimination of certain phenomena, often from scientific or philosophical discourse. The most common form of eliminationism is eliminative materialism, which posits that our common-sense understanding of the mind, known as folk psychology, is fundamentally mistaken and should be replaced by a neuroscientific account. Proponents of eliminative materialism argue that concepts like beliefs, desires, and intentions do not refer to real entities and that future neuroscience will demonstrate their falsity.

The core idea behind eliminationism is that some concepts or theories we currently hold are so deeply flawed that they cannot be corrected or refined, but must be entirely discarded. This contrasts with revisionary approaches, which aim to improve or reform existing concepts. For example, a revisionary materialist might argue that while our current understanding of consciousness is imperfect, it can be gradually refined through further scientific investigation. An eliminative materialist, however, would argue that concepts like consciousness itself are part of a fundamentally flawed framework.

Eliminationism is a controversial stance, often met with criticism for being counter-intuitive and potentially self-defeating. Critics argue that the very act of arguing for eliminationism relies on concepts that the theory seeks to eliminate, such as beliefs and intentions. Despite these criticisms, eliminationism remains an active area of debate in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, pushing for a rigorous examination of our conceptual frameworks and their relationship to scientific reality.