sensatus

Sensatus is a term that appears in some discussions of consciousness and the philosophy of mind to denote the qualitative, felt aspect of sensory experience—the subjective feel of sensation. In this usage, sensatus refers to what it is like to experience a sensory event, as opposed to the informational content or neural representations that convey stimuli to the brain. The term is not part of a standardized vocabulary and remains a niche or coined concept in many discussions.

Etymology and scope. Sensatus is formed from roots related to sense, with the intent of naming the experiential aspect of sensation. In practice, the concept is used to emphasize the phenomenological dimension of experience—the raw feel of a color, tone, texture, or odor—rather than its cognitive interpretation or describable content. It is intended to function as a label for the subjective substrate that underlies perception across modalities.

Relation to other concepts. Sensatus is often discussed in relation to qualia, phenomenology, and sensory content. Some authors use sensatus to distinguish the subjective feel from the perceptual judgments, reports, or inferred properties of objects. Others treat it as a redundant or ambiguous term that overlaps with established notions of phenomenological experience.

Criticisms and status. The term lacks broad consensus and is not widely adopted in mainstream philosophy of mind. Critics argue that it can obscure more established distinctions, such as those between sensory experience and cognitive processing, or between qualia and representational content. Proponents contend that sensatus can help clarify discussions about the nature of felt experience.

See also. Qualia, Phenomenology, Sensation, Perception.