performativesspeech

Performative speech, or performatives, refers to speech acts that accomplish something by being spoken, rather than merely describing a state of affairs. In the theory of speech acts developed by J. L. Austin, a performative utterance is one that enacts an action simply by the act of saying it, examples include "I apologize," "I promise," or "I name this ship." By contrast, constative (or descriptive) utterances report facts and can be true or false.

Key to performatives is the idea of illocutionary force—the performative's function in enacting an action. Austin later described felicity conditions under which a performative is successful: the speaker must have authority, the utterance must be made in an appropriate institutional or social context, conventional steps must be followed, and the act must be sincere and properly executed. Searle refined this with categories like verdictives, exercitives, commissives, and others, emphasizing that the strength of a performative depends on social conventions and the speaker's status.

Examples illustrate the reach of performative speech across domains: legal pronouncements ("This court declares..."), ceremonial rituals ("I now pronounce you man and wife"), and everyday commitments ("I will pay you back tomorrow"). Not all statements labeled as performatives actually perform actions; some may be hollow or illocutionary in a weak sense, and some utterances fail due to broken felicity conditions, irony, or insincerity. In contemporary analysis, the concept informs studies of institutional discourse, political rhetoric, and online language, where performative force can be invoked by pronouncements, commitments, and declarations.