minddependence

Minddependence is a term used in philosophy of mind and cognitive science to describe the extent to which mental states, processes, and phenomena rely on internal brain states, cognitive architecture, and, in some theories, on external factors such as tools, environments, or social practices. The notion is not a single theory but a dimension used to compare positions on how tightly mental phenomena are bound to nonmental bases.

On one reading, minddependence is primarily about ontological or causal dependence within the head: mental states are dependent on neural states and processing. In physicalist or reductionist accounts, every mental property supervenes on physical properties, making mindstates ultimately dependent on brain states.

Other uses emphasize external dependence: according to extended mind proposals, cognitive processes may extend beyond the skull to include environmental elements such as notebooks, smartphones, or other collaborators. In these views, mental states are not fully individuated by internal conditions alone but by their cognitive roles within an extended system.

Philosophers distinguish various forms of dependence, including causal dependence, functional dependence (the idea that the mind’s states are defined by their causal roles), and constitutive dependence (where a mental state is partly constituted by external factors). Examples include memory reliance on hippocampal activity versus external memory aids; perceptual content depending on sensory input; or an agent's belief content shaped by linguistic and cultural environments.

Debates about minddependence touch on reductionism, explanation of consciousness, and the scope of the extended mind thesis. The term remains informal and is used differently by authors, serving as a heuristic to discuss how much mental phenomena rely on internal versus external bases.