fictionalists

Fictionalists are philosophers who defend fictionalism, a family of views about how to understand certain kinds of discourse. They hold that talk about some domains—most commonly ethics, mathematics, and science—does not aim to state literal truths about real objects, but functions within a useful or coherent fiction. In this sense, such statements may guide inquiry and practice without committing the speaker to ontological claims.

The approach is typically divided into three strands. Moral fictionalism argues that moral talk is best understood as operating within a social practice of norms that functions like a shared fiction; morality remains useful for coordination even if moral properties do not exist independently. Mathematical fictionalism argues that statements about numbers and sets are not claims about real abstract objects; mathematics is a powerful fictional framework whose techniques succeed without ontological commitment to mathematical objects. Scientific fictionalism extends this idea to theory talk about unobservable entities, treating such discourse as fictional scaffolding that organizes observation and experiment.

Proponents emphasize the explanatory success of fictionalist interpretations, the avoidance of ontological commitments, and compatibility with natural language use. Critics challenge whether talk can be both truth-apt and fictional, and whether fiction can sustain normative authority or explanatory power.

Historically, mathematical fictionalism is associated with Hartry Field, among others, while ethical discussions have developed independently within the broader literature on fictionalism.

See also: fictionalism, ethics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science.