disjunktiivsus

Disjunktiivsus, or disjunctivism, is a philosophical view concerning free will and moral responsibility that emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty‑first centuries. It argues that for an agent to be morally responsible for an action, the agent must have control over the action in a special, non‑causal sense. The theory claims that an agent can be deliberately triggering an action without the action being a direct causal consequence of that deliberation, thereby allowing moral responsibility to stand even if deterministic forces are at play.

The origins of disjunktiivsus can be traced to the work of philosophers such as William James and the early analytic tradition, though it was significantly developed by Peter van Inwagen and Roderick Chisholm, who differentiated between possessing a “sense of control” and a purely causal connection. According to the view, responsibility depends on an agent’s capacity for “control of the means,” not merely on the outcome of deterministic processes.

Disjunctivism contrasts with compatibilist accounts, which claim that free will is compatible with determinism by redefining the notion of control, and with libertarian accounts that posit genuine indeterminism. Critics question whether disjunctivism can provide a robust mechanism for specifying the kind of control required, and whether it remains coherent when applied to real-world moral judgments. Despite these challenges, the theory continues to influence contemporary discussions on free will, offering a distinctive perspective that emphasizes the qualitative aspects of agency.