Permissivism

Permissivism is a philosophical stance concerning the nature of moral judgment. It proposes that all moral judgments are true. This means that for any moral statement, such as "Stealing is wrong," permissivism asserts that this statement is true. This does not necessarily imply that all actions are morally permissible, but rather that all claims about what is morally permissible or impermissible are true in some sense.

There are different interpretations of permissivism. Some versions might argue that moral statements are true in virtue of some underlying moral reality, while others might adopt a more deflationary or conceptualist approach. For instance, a permissivist might hold that "X is wrong" is true because the concept of "wrongness" is satisfied by X. This contrasts with moral skepticism, which doubts the possibility of moral knowledge, or moral nihilism, which claims that no moral judgments are true.

The implications of permissivism are significant for understanding moral discourse. If all moral judgments are true, then apparent moral disagreements might be a result of differing interpretations of moral terms, different conceptual frameworks, or even factual disagreements about the world. It raises questions about how we ought to reason about morality and the nature of moral truth itself. The view is not widely held in contemporary ethics, but it continues to be a topic of philosophical discussion.