vetowielding

Vetowielding is the practice of using veto power to block or condition policy proposals within a political system that grants one or more actors a veto. It encompasses formal vetoes, conditional approvals, and strategic bargaining aimed at shaping legislation.

In constitutional politics, veto wielding takes forms such as a presidential veto, a legislative veto by a second chamber, or a budget veto that blocks particular spending lines. In international affairs, veto power often resides in the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which can block resolutions regardless of majority support.

History and practice: Vetowielding shapes bargaining dynamics; its effectiveness depends on institutional design, such as override rules, time constraints, and transparency. It can prevent hasty reforms, but also entrench deadlock and undermine accountability.

Critics argue veto wielding concentrates power in a narrow circle, delaying or derailing policy with limited popular legitimacy. Proposals to reform governance include supermajority thresholds, time limits on vetoes, or more open bargaining forums.

Related concepts include veto players theory, pocket veto, and minority rights considerations in legislative design.