principalügynök

A principalügynök, often translated as principal agent, is a key concept in economics and political science that describes a relationship where one party, the principal, delegates tasks or authority to another party, the agent. The agent is expected to act in the best interests of the principal. Examples of this relationship are found in many contexts, such as between shareholders (principals) and corporate executives (agents), or between citizens (principals) and elected officials (agents).

The core challenge within the principal-agent relationship is the information asymmetry that often exists. The agent typically possesses more information about their actions and efforts than the principal. This can lead to agency problems, where the agent's self-interest may diverge from the principal's interests, resulting in behaviors like shirking, opportunism, or taking on excessive risk.

To mitigate these problems, principals often implement various mechanisms. These can include incentive contracts, monitoring systems, performance-based compensation, and establishing clear rules and oversight bodies. The effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the specific context and the ability to align the agent's incentives with the principal's goals. The study of principal-agent relationships and the associated agency costs is a significant area of research aimed at understanding and improving the efficiency of organizational structures and governance.