metanormativity

Metanormativity is a term used in philosophy to denote the study of normative standards themselves—the norms that govern our evaluation of norms. It concerns the status, justification, and authority of normative claims: what counts as a legitimate norm, what reasons are required to endorse a norm, and who may authorize or reform normative systems. In practice, metanormativity distinguishes object-level norms (such as “one ought not lie”) from meta-level norms about how those norms are chosen, justified, or revised.

Key questions include: what grounds normative force (truth, reasons, social conventions, or rational agreement)? How do we determine whether a norm is justified or binding? What makes a norm authoritative, and who has the standing to create or revise norms? Different meta-normative theories offer different answers, including moral realism, constructivism, expressivism, or pragmatist approaches.

The topic intersects with metaethics, political philosophy, law, and feminist and critical theory. It is used to examine how social, political, and epistemic power shapes which norms count as legitimate, how normativity is produced and enforced, and how reformulations of norms occur. It can illuminate debates about the authority of moral claims, the status of human rights, or the legitimacy of social practices.

Critics argue that metanormativity can be highly abstract or distract from concrete normative issues, while proponents maintain that it clarifies the foundations of normative discourse and helps explain disagreement and change in normative environments.