intuitus

Intuitus is a term that appears in Latin and in some contemporary discourses as a revived or specialized concept. It does not have a single, universally accepted definition, and its meaning varies by context. In Latin, intuitus derives from intueri, meaning to look at or contemplate; the participle or noun form intuitus appears in late Latin and medieval texts, sometimes rendered as "insight" or "perception." In modern philosophy and cognitive science, intuitus is used by a minority of authors to denote an immediate, non-discursive form of understanding that serves as a basis for belief or judgment. This usage is distinct from but related to the common term intuition, and it is not widely standardized.

Philosophically, proponents describe intuitus as an epistemic episode of apprehension that does not proceed by stepwise inference. Critics argue that such judgments are fallible and subject to bias, and that the lack of explicit justification makes intuitus difficult to assess. In cognitive science, intuitus is sometimes employed to refer to fast, automatic judgments that emerge from unconscious processing, aligning with dual-process theories that separate intuitive (Type 1) from analytical (Type 2) reasoning.

Because intuitus is not widely established, precise definitions and prescriptions vary across texts and disciplines. It appears mainly in niche scholarly writings, glossaries of philosophical terms, or as a stylized Latinization in discussions of epistemology.

See also: intuition, intuitive judgment, non-discursive justification, Kantian intuition.