illocutoire

Illocutoire, in linguistics and philosophy of language, refers to the illocutionary act—the part of a spoken utterance that expresses the speaker’s intention and performs a social function. It is distinguished from the locutionary act (the actual words and their literal meaning) and the perlocutionary act (the effect the utterance has on the listener).

An illocutionary act conveys the speaker’s force or purpose, such as asserting, warning, ordering, promising, apologizing, or congratulating. The concept is central to speech act theory, notably in the work of J. L. Austin and later John Searle. A key idea is that utterances are not merely about content but perform actions through their force.

Classification of illocutionary acts is common in analysis. Searle groups them into five broad kinds: assertives (stating beliefs or facts), directives (urging the listener to do something), commissives (committing the speaker to a future action), expressives (expressing attitudes or emotions), and declarations (bringing about a change in the world through the utterance, such as declaring a meeting open). Some utterances are explicit performatives, containing explicit performative verbs like “I promise” or “I apologize,” which themselves constitute the illocutionary act.

Felicity conditions govern success: the speaker must have appropriate authority or credibility, sincerity, and socially recognized conventions for the act to be valid. If these conditions fail, the illocutionary act may misfire or be ineffective.

The term illocutoire is used in French-language discussions of speech act theory and corresponds to the English term illocutionary act. It remains a foundational concept for understanding how language accomplishes action beyond its literal meaning.