enaktivism

Enactivism is a theoretical framework in cognitive science and philosophy of mind that posits cognition arises through the active, embodied engagement of an organism with its environment. Rather than treating mental processes as the manipulation of internal representations, enactivism emphasizes sense-making: living beings bring forth meaning through their ongoing interactions with the world.

The approach traces its origins to the work of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, who introduced autopoiesis to describe how living systems maintain their organization through continual exchange with their surroundings. The perspective was developed further by researchers such as Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, notably in The Embodied Mind (1991), which integrates phenomenology with cognitive science. Core commitments include embodiment (cognition depends on the body), enactment (perception and action are inseparable), and the idea that cognition is grounded in historical and environmental contexts.

Enactivism also emphasizes social dimensions of cognition through participatory sense-making, where interaction with others contributes to the emergence of meaning. Related strands include sensorimotor enactivism, associated with Noë, and social enactivism, developed by Di Paolo and De Jaegher. The broader concept of 4E cognition—embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended—often overlaps with enactivist ideas, though distinctions exist regarding the role of external tools and representations.

Applications of enactivism appear in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, psychology, education, robotics, and human–computer interaction. Critics argue about the extent to which enactivism can account for internal neural structures and the difficulty of empirical testing, while supporters contend that it offers a coherent framework for understanding how cognition arises from lived experience and interaction.