emotivizmus

Emotivizmus is a meta-ethical theory that asserts ethical statements are not propositions that can be true or false, but rather expressions of emotion or attitudes. It posits that moral judgments primarily serve to express the speaker's feelings about a subject, such as approval or disapproval, and to influence the feelings and actions of others. For example, saying "Stealing is wrong" is interpreted not as a factual claim about stealing, but as an expression of dislike for stealing, aiming to evoke a similar dislike in the listener.

This view contrasts with ethical theories that see moral statements as objective descriptions of reality or as commands from a divine authority. Emotivists argue that moral disagreements are not about differing beliefs concerning objective facts, but rather about differing emotional responses or preferences. Therefore, they contend that moral discourse is fundamentally non-cognitive, meaning it does not convey factual knowledge. Key figures associated with emotivism include A.J. Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson. While emotivism offers a way to understand the persuasive and motivational power of moral language, it has been criticized for potentially undermining the possibility of genuine moral reasoning and objective moral truth.