constatativity

Constatativity is a term used in linguistics and philosophy of language to describe the property of a statement or utterance that makes it capable of being asserted or declared as true or false. It refers to the fact that a given proposition has a truth value, even if that value is not yet known or ascertainable. A constatative utterance is one that states a fact or makes a claim about the world, as opposed to performative utterances which perform an action by being spoken, such as "I promise" or "I declare war."

The concept of constatativity is closely linked to the idea of truth conditions. For a statement to be constatable, it must be possible to determine under what circumstances it would be true and under what circumstances it would be false. This does not mean that the truth value must be easily accessible or even definitively knowable, but rather that the statement is capable of having a determinate truth value. The distinction between constative and performative utterances was famously introduced by J.L. Austin. While performatives do things, constatives, in Austin's initial formulation, merely describe or assert something. Later philosophical developments have explored the nuances and potential overlap between these categories.