DURC

DURC stands for dual-use research of concern. It refers to life sciences research that, while intended to benefit public health, agriculture, or security, could also be misused to pose significant threats. The concept gained prominence in policy discussions about biotechnology in the 2010s, particularly in the United States, where the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) and government agencies shaped early frameworks for oversight.

Scope and criteria: A project is typically considered DURC if the knowledge, data, or technologies it produces could be reasonably anticipated to provide, directly or indirectly, capabilities that could be misused to pose a significant threat. The assessments focus on potential outcomes and the consequences of dissemination. Commonly cited DURC categories include experiments that could increase a pathogen’s transmissibility or host range, enhance virulence or environmental stability, or enable novel modes of dissemination, immune evasion, or resistance to medical countermeasures. It covers work involving biological agents or toxins, or technologies that enable growth, propagation, or survival of harmful agents.

Governance and practice: In the United States, DURC oversight requires institutions to identify DURC within research proposals and ongoing projects, perform risk-benefit analyses, implement risk mitigation strategies, and address publication or dissemination with potential restrictions. Some countries impose similar oversight or require reporting to authorities. Internationally, guidance varies but emphasizes biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible communication of sensitive information.

Impact and debates: DURC policy seeks to balance scientific progress with public safety, prompting debates about transparency, academic freedom, and worst-case risk. High-profile cases, such as gain-of-function studies on avian influenza, have driven calls for clearer oversight and standardized mitigation measures.

See also: dual-use research of concern, biosafety, biosecurity, gain-of-function.