intensionelle

Intensionelle is a term used in philosophy of language and linguistics to describe phenomena related to intensionality in meaning and reference. In this sense, it refers to the properties of linguistic expressions and contexts where substitution of co-referential terms may change truth conditions.

A key distinction is between intension (sense or content) and extension (the set of things the term applies to). Intensional contexts, such as beliefs, desires, necessity, or possibility, can resist straightforward substitution of terms that have the same extension in the actual world. For example, expressions referring to different senses of a name or phrase can yield different truth values inside propositional attitude reports, even if their extensions coincide in the real world.

In formal semantics, intensional analysis is modeled with possible-worlds semantics. An expression’s intension is treated as a function from possible worlds to extensions. This allows the logic to capture how truth conditions vary across worlds and how mental states or modal operators interact with reference and sense. The distinction between intension and extension traces back to Frege’s sense and reference and was later developed in Montague grammar and the possible-worlds framework, with influential work by Kripke and Lewis.

Intensionelle encompasses a range of topics, including propositional attitudes, modal logic, and cross-linguistic semantics. It informs analyses in linguistics, cognitive science, and natural language processing, where accurately modeling how meaning shifts with context is essential. See also intension, extension, possible-worlds semantics, and propositional attitude.